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STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court granted WCF's motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief limited to 
(a) the functioning of the medical panels allowed by Utah Code§ 34A-2-601 and (b) the 
interpretation and requirements of Section 34A-2-601. Accordingly, this brief is limited 
to those issues. 
"[M]atters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for 
CotTectness." Further, "[w]here the issue is a question of law, ... appellate review gives 
no deference to the trial judge's or the agency's determination, because the appellate 
court has 'the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform 
throughout the jurisdiction."' Esquivel v. Labor Comm 'n of Utah, 2000 UT 66, ,r 13, 7 
P.3d 777. See Murray v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2013 UT 38, ,r,r 22, 29, 36-40, 308 P.3d 
461 ( court will apply non-deferential standard to Labor Commission's interpretation of 
the law and review its interpretation for correctness). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Central to the decision of the District Court was the interpretation of two 
provisions of Utah Code § 34A-2-601. The first involves the interpretation of Section 
34A-2-601 (2)(b ), which provides: 
(2)(b) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall make: 
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form prescribed 
by the Division of Adjudication; and 
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may require. 
Utah Code§ 34A-2-601(2)(b). 
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The second interpretation involves Section 34A-2-601(d), which provides, 
2( d)(i) An administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of 
a report submitted to the administrative law judge under this Subsection (2) by 
mail to: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; 
(C) the employer's insurance carrier; and 
(D) an attorney employed by a person listed in Subsections 
2(d)(i)(A) through (C). 
(ii) Within 20 days after the report described in Subsection 2( d)(i) is 
deposited in the United States post office, the following may file with the 
administrative law judge a written objection to the report: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; or 
(C) the employer's insurance carrier. 
(iii) If no written objection is filed within the period described in 
Subsection (2)( d)(ii), the report is considered admitted into evidence. 
Utah Code§ 34A-2-601(d). A complete copy of Utah Code§ 34A-2-601 is included in 
the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Given the limited scope of its amicus curiae brief, WCF states only those facts that 
inform the question of the interpretation of Section 34A-2-601. Utah's Workers' 
Compensation Act provides compensation, including, without limitation, medical care 
and loss wage benefits, to employees who suffer injury or death contracted, sustained, 
aggravated, or incurred by the employee arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment. See Utah Code§§ 34A-2-401, 34A-3-107. If an injured 
employee contests the action of the employee's employer or its insurance carrier 
concerning a compensable injury, the aggrieved employee may file an application for a 
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hearing with the Division of Adjudication of the Utah Labor Commission (the "Division 
of Adjudication"). See Utah Code§ 34A-2-801 to 803. 
On the filing of a claim for compensation arising out of or in the course of 
employment for disability or death by accident or due to an occupational disease, Section 
34A-2-601 allows the Division of Adjudication to refer the medical aspects of a case to a 
medical panel if the employer or the employer's insurance catTier denies liability. Utah 
Code§ 34A-2-60l(l)(a) & (b); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("FFCL"), R. 
102 7, ,r,r 6, 9. Indeed, former Chief Administrative Law Judge Richard LaJeunesse 
("Chief ALJ LaJeunesse") testified that a lot of the workers' compensation cases use 
medical panels; R. 1126, 1175 {Lines 17-18). 
Historically, on receipt of the written report from the medical panel, and consistent 
with the language of Section 34A-2-60 I, the administrative law judges ("ALJ") of the 
Division of Adjudication, would mail the medical panel report to the employee, the 
employer, the employer's insurance carrier, and their respective attorneys. This would 
trigger the parties' obligation to review and make objections, if any, to the medical 
panel's report. Id. § 34A-2-601(d); see Testimony of Chief ALJ LaJeunesse at R. 1126, 
1176 (Lines 4) through 1177 (Line 24 ); R. 1180 (Line 22) through 1181 (Line 9). 
Based on complaints about the quality of the medical panel reports, FFCL, 
R. 1029, ,r,r 18-19, 22, in January 2012, Chief ALJ LaJeunesse and Administrative Law 
Judge Debbie Hann ("ALJ Hann") reviewed Section 34A-2-601 and decided that the 
statute should be interpreted differently than previously applied by the Division of 
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Adjudication. FFCL, R. 1030, 1123-24. Without discussing the matter with the other 
administrative law judges; the Labor Commission's legal counsel, Alan Hennebold; the 
Commissioner of the Utah Labor Commission, Sherrie Hayashi; the advisory committee 
appointed under Utah Code § 34A-2-107; or other stakeholders involved in the 
adjudication process, R. 1126, 1205 (Line 8) through 1211 (Line 19), Chief ALJ 
LeJeunesse and ALJ Hann decided that the statute gave them the authority to review and 
request changes to a medical panel report (a) without notice to the affected parties or their 
counsel and (b) without sending a copy of the original medical panel report to the parties, 
the insurance carrier, and the parties' respective legal counsel. FFCL, R. 1030, 123-24. 
Testimony of Chief ALJ LaJeunesse, R. 1126, 1191 (Lines 17-20). Instead, after 
receiving a medical panel report revised at her request, ALJ Hann, with the knowledge 
and permission of Chief ALJ LaJeunesse, would send the revised report to the parties but 
would not infom1 the parties that the repo11 had been altered in any respect from the 
original. While the District Court found that Chief ALJ LaJeunesse did not participate 
and was unaware, the evidence showed that ALJ Hann destroyed at least two of the 
original medical panel reports and caused the receipt of several of the original medical 
panel reports to be removed from the docket so as not to trigger the parties' 20-day period 
in which to object to the report as set out in Section 34A-2-60l(d). FFCL, R. 1030-31, 11 
31-33; R. 1037-1038, 1110, 14. Chief ALJ LaJeunesse stated that it was his and ALJ 
Hann' s intent to correct errors of law or phrasing contained in the reports and to train the 
physicians who were preparing the reports. FFCL, R. 1030, 1 26. 
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Chief ALJ LaJeunesse and ALJ Hann did not inform the other administrative law 
judges of their new interpretation of the statute. Testimony of Chief ALJ LaJeunesse, R. 
1126, 1205 (line 8) through R. 1211 (line 19). No ALJ other than ALJ Hann engaged in 
the practice of rejecting signed medical panel reports and requesting changes without 
notice to the parties. FFCL, R. 1034, ,r 55. Chief ALJ LaJeunesse's only involvement was 
a telephone conversation with a medical panel relating to a treatment protocol suggested 
by the medical panel that had not been adopted by the Labor Commission and a request 
that the report be revised to clarify that the standards were not binding on treating 
physicians. FFCL, R. 1031, ,r 34. 
On learning of their actions, the Labor Commission's legal counsel and the 
Commissioner instructed Chief ALJ LaJeunesse (a) to instruct all of the ALJs 
immediately to provide a copy of the original medical report, without revision, to the 
affected parties and their counsel and (b) to draft a policy consistent with the Division of 
Adjudication's previous practice of immediately providing a copy of the original medical 
panel report to the parties and their respective counsel. FFCL, R. 1032, ,r 41-43; R. 1033, 
,r 44; see also Testimony of Commissioner Sherrie Hayashi, R. 1643, 1762 (Line 18) to 
R. 1766 (Line 25) & Ex. 107. 
The Commissioner of the Labor Commission also requested that the Governor's 
office conduct an audit of the actions of Chief ALJ LaJuenesse and ALJ Hann to 
determine the scope of the cases impacted by their actions. The Governor's office issued 
a written report dated July 3, 2012 (the "Governor's Audit Report"). The Governor's 
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Audit Report indicated that five cases had been affected by Chief ALJ LaJeunesse and 
ALJ Hann's actions. See also FFCL, R. 1031-1032, ,, 34-36; R. 1033, ,145-46; see also 
Testimony of Commissioner Sherrie Hayashi, R. 1643, 1769 (Line 16) through R. 1770 
(Line 25) & Ex. 104. 
The Governor's Audit Report identified the following modifications requested by 
ALJ Hann. 
• Removing treatment guidelines cited in the report to, according to the 
presiding ALJ, avoid the appearance that the division supported those 
specific guidelines in future cases. 
• Removing prior diagnoses from a treating physician and independent 
medical examiner. 
• Clarifying statements that encouraged the injured worker to exercise and 
take an active role in his recovery. 
• Removing of a statement in the Medical Panel Report that contradicted the 
court's findings of fact. 
• Removing of justification as to why the Medical Panel answered definitive 
questions. 
• Changing language from "possible but highly unlikely" to "no," among 
other similar changes. 
• Modifying style in order to, according to the ALJ and Medical Panel chairs, 
increase the report's readability. 
Ex. 104 at p. 10. See also FFCL, R. 1031-1032, 1~ 34-36. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Contrary to the District Court's decision, the medical panel provision set out in 
Section 34A-2-601 does not grant administrative law judges ("ALJs") the discretion to 
request changes to medical reports issued by medical panels, nor to request such changes 
without providing the reports to the relevant parties or granting the parties the 
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opportunity to object. Id. at 34-A-2-60 I ( d)(i)-(ii). An interpretation of Section 
34A-2-601 permitting such conduct would be inimical to the text of the Act and 
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Such a reading would deprive the parties of 
their statutory right to see the report promptly after it is issued and to register any 
objection as to the report's content. Id. Even if the Act could be read to grant discretion to 
the ALJ to request ad hoc changes to the report by the medical panel ·without providing 
notice to the parties or an opportunity to object, no reasonable interpretation of the Act 
vvould permit the type of substantive changes found in the medical reports at issue in this 
case. Nor can the ALJ comply with the statutory mandate to "promptly distribute'~ the 
medical report upon receipt by requesting that the panel amend the report and failing to 
provide notice of the amendment to the parties and denying the parties of the statutory 
right to object. Moreover, failing to provide the report to the parties prior to requesting 
such changes or failing, at the very least, to maintain a record of every version of the 
report, would prevent the Labor Commissioner, or the Commission Appeals Board, or the 
Utah Court of Appeals from fulfilling their duty to review the ALI' s decisions, as well as 
the ALJ's conduct of the hearing, for abuse of discretion. Because the District Court's 
ruling would deprive parties in a Labor Commission proceeding of notice of potentially 
substantive changes to the medical report and would deprive them of their statutory right 
to object, the District Court's interpretation of the Act should be rejected. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
LEGAL ST AND ARD FOR INTERPRETING A ST A TUTE 
When the Court interprets a statute, its "primary purpose is to evince the true 
intent and purpose of the legislature. The best indication of the legislature's intent is the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the statute's terms." Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n., 2016 UT 1,113,367 P.3d 989 (citations omitted). In this matter, the 
interpretation of Utah Code§ 34A-2-601 largely turns on the meaning of two phrases. 
First, Section 34A-2-601(2)(b) provides that a medical panel "shall make" (i) a report in 
writing to the administrative law judge in a form prescribed by the Division of 
Adjudication; and (ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may require. 
Utah Code § 34A-2-601 (2)(b) ( emphasis added). Second, Section 34A-2-601 ( d) provides 
that an "administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of a report 
submitted to the administrative law judge" to the applicant, the employer, the employer's 
insurance carrier, and the attorneys for the respective parties. Id. ( emphasis added). 
The act does not define either the phrase "in a form prescribed" by the Division of 
Adjudication or "promptly." As this Court frequently has noted, if a statutory enactment 
does not define the operative term, 
we discern an operative standard from dictionary definitions of the term 
and from other textual and contextual cues within the statute .... 
. .. Because [the] term is not expressly defined in the Act, and does not appear to 
be a technical term of art, we construe it to partake of "the ordinary meaning" the 
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r;:)I ~ 
word "would have to a reasonable person familiar with the usage and context of 
the language in question. 
The starting point for discerning such meaning is the dictionary. A 
dictionary is useful in cataloging a range of possible meanings that the statutory 
term may bear. It provides an "historical record, not necessarily all-inclusive, of 
the meaning which words in fact have bourne." Such a record, however, will often 
fail to dictate "what meaning a word must bear in a particular context." That 
question will often require further refinement-of selecting the best meaning 
among a range of options, based on other indicators of meaning evident in the 
"context of the statute (including, particularly, the structure and language of the 
statutory scheme." 
Hi-Counhy Prop. Rights Group v. Emmer, 2013 UT 33, ,r,r 17-19, 304 P.3d 851 (citations 
omitted). 
II. 
THE FUNCTION AND PURPOSE OF A MEDICAL PANEL IS TO PROVIDE 
GUIDANCE TO THE UTAH LABOR COMMISSION AS IT RESOLVES 
MEDICAL DISPUTES IN CLAIMS FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS. 
Among other things, the Utah Worker's Compensation Fund Act (the "Act") 
provides a mechanism that allows the Division of Adjudication to refer the medical 
aspects of a case to a medical panel appointed by an ALJ on the filing by an employee of 
a claim for compensation arising out of and in the course of employment for disability or 
death by accident or due to an occupational disease if the employer or the employer's 
insurance carrier denies liability. See Utah Code§ 34A-2-601(1). 
A. The Purpose of the Medical Panels. 
A unique aspect of workers' compensation claims, as opposed to a personal injury 
claim, is the use of medical panels when there is a dispute on medical issues. Utah Code 
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Ann. § 34A-2-601 (I) (a) states, ··The Division of Adjudication may refer the medical 
aspects of a case described in this Subsection ( I )(a) to a medical panel appointed by an 
administrative law judge!' These medical panels are to "consist of one or more 
physicians specializing in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim." 
Utah Code Ann.§ 34A-2-60l(l)(c). 
Assigned panels are provided a set of Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order, relevant medical evidence, and are allowed to conduct their own 
examination and interview of the injured worker in order to assist providing the ALJ with 
a competent medical opinion. See Certified Bldg. Maint. v. Labor Comm'n, Appeals Bd. 
of the Labor Comm'n, 2012 UT App 240, 285 P.3d 831. See FFCL, R. 1028, ,i 11; 
Testimony of Hans Scheffler, R. 1412, 1573 (Line 25) through R. 1587 (Line 10). The 
panel may also "make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests ... as it may 
determine to be necessary or desirable." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(a). 
The "proper purpose" of the medical panel is limited to medical examination and 
diagnosis. Jensen v. United States Fuel Co., 424 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 1967). The purpose 
has been further elaborated to evaluate medical evidence and advise the administrative 
law judge with respect to the judge's fact finding responsibility. Danny's D,ywall v. 
Labor Commission, 2014 UT App 277, ~14, 339 P.3d 624. When the issue before the 
Labor Commission is "primarily of causation, the importance of the ... medical panel 
becomes manifest. It is through the expertise of the medical panel that the Commission 
should be able to make the determination of whether the injury sustained by the claimant 
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is causally connected or contributed to by the claimant's employment." Blair v. Labor 
Comm 'n, 2011 UT App 248, ,I 18,262 P.3d 456 (quoting Schmidt v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980)). 
Although an ALJ "may base the ... findings and decision on the report, ... the 
administrative law judge is not bound by a report. .. if other substantial conflicting 
evidence in the case supports a contrary finding." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-601 (2)( e )(i)-(ii). The "final responsibility of making the decision as to the issues 
in such a proceeding is given to the Commission," and the ALJ or Commission cannot 
delegate that responsibility to the panel. Washington County School Dist. v. Labor 
Comm 'n, 2013 UT App. 205, ,I 42, 309 P.3d 299; Accord Jensen v. United States Fuel 
Co., 424 P.2d 440,442 (Utah 1967). Thus, the role of the medical panel is only 
"to assist the administrative law judge" in adjudicating whether medical cause has been 
proven. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n of Utah, 
839 P .2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1992) ( citing Price River Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm 'n, 731 
P.2d 1079, 1084 (Utah 1986)). 
Testimony of several witnesses at trial underscored the purpose and importance of 
the medical panels. Dennis Lloyd, WCF's Senior Vice President and Chief Legal Officer, 
who has been involved with or had knowledge of the medical panel system since 1981, 
stated, 
The medical panel program with the Labor Commission dates back many, many 
years, and they're a vital resource to the Labor Commission, formally called the 
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Industrial Commission. They provide expert medical advice to the Labor 
Commission in the adjudication of disputed workers compensation claims. 
R. 1126, 1281 (Lines 7-11). 
Mr. Lloyd also testified, 
The medical panel offers their expert opinion to the Labor Commission, the 
administrative law judge as to what the medical issues are in the case. It could be 
medical causation, it would be periods of disability, temporary total disability. It 
could be impairment. It could be issues of permanent total disability, those sorts of 
things that may be disagreed to by the treating physicians for the injured worker or 
the physician for the employer, and then based on that opinion by the medical 
panel doctor, the administrative ---
R. 1126. 1281 (Lines 2-10). See also Testimony of Hans Scheffler, R. 1412, 1573 (Line 
25) through R. 1587 (Line 10). 
In response to a question about the independence of the medical panels, Mr. Lloyd 
testified, 
Well, I believe very much from their origins, the Industrial Commission, the Labor 
Commission needs them to be independent, and has designed them to provide 
independent medical advice to the Labor Commission and the administrative law 
judges because they are reviewing medical records and opinions that are offered 
on behalf of the parties. The injured worker, who is treated by a physician, will 
have an opinion from a doctor, and the employer who will have a medical opinion 
often from their advising physician, and so the medical panel is used by the Labor 
Commission to be an independent source of medical evidence. 
R. 1126, 1281 (Lines 13-23). See FFCL, R. 1027, ii 8. 
B. Utah's Medical Panel History. 
Utah's medical panel requirements have evolved over time from a relatively 
limited application at their inception to an integral tool used to resolve medical disputes 
in Utah's workers' compensation system today. The medical panel process was originally 
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adopted by the Utah legislature in 1949. While the medical panels initially were only 
used in occupational disease claims involving permanent total disability, some of the key 
provisions of that initial iteration of the medical panel process are still applicable today. 
Of particular relevance is a provision in the 1949 statute which provided that a 
panel report "shall be made to the commission in writing ... " and "the commission shall 
promptly distribute by mail full copies of such report to the claimant, employer against 
whom compensation is claimed and the insurance carrier." Utah Code§ 42-1A-48(II) 
(1949) (the "Medical Panel Provision''). The Labor Commission was bound by the 
medical panel's conclusions unless the parties objected to the written report within 10 
days. While the statute has been amended several times, the requirement of a written 
report promptly distributed to the affected parties has remained constant. 
The medical panel process was amended in 1951 to extend to all types of disability 
and death claims caused by an alleged occupational disease, including permanent total, 
temporary total, and temporary partial disability claims. This amendment also extended 
the objection period to 15 days and required a hearing on the objections within 30 days. 
Any party could request the medical panel members be present at the hearing for 
examination and cross-examination. In addition, the Labor Commission was no longer 
bound by a medical panel's conclusions as long as there was "substantial conflicting 
evidence in the case which supports contrary findings by the commission." Id. (1951 
amendment). 
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In 1955, the legislature extended use of medical panels to all industrial accident 
claims, in addition to all occupational disease claims. This 1955 amendment required 
referral to a medical panel for all industrial accident claims where liability was denied, 
even if there was not a direct dispute regarding medical causation. The statute also was 
recodified. See Utah Code § 35-1-77 (1955). In 1969, the Medical Panel Provision was 
amended to require the medical panel chairman to be present for examination at the 
hearing following an objection to a medical panel report. Other medical panel members 
were required to attend only for good cause shown. Id. ( 1969 amendment). The statute 
was again amended in 1979 to remove the requirement that a hearing must be set within 
30 days from the date of an objection to a medical panel report and did not impose a new 
deadline. Id. (1979 amendment). 
In 1982, the statute was amended to make referral to a medical panel and setting a 
case for hearing on an objection to a medical panel report discretionary rather than 
mandatory in industrial accident claims. Id. (1982 amendment). The 1988 amendment 
allowed the Labor Commission to create a full or part-time medical director position to 
issue medical opinions regarding medical causation as an alternative to the medical panel 
process if agreed to by all parties. Utah Code§ 35-l-77(l)(b) (1988). The 1991 
amendment added occupational disease claims to the industrial accident medical panel 
statute and required that all disputed occupational disease disability and death claims be 
referred to a medical panel. Utah Code §35-1-77(l)(b)- (c) (1991 amendment). The 2002 
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amendment made appointment of a medical panel in occupational disease claims 
discretionary. Utah Code §34A-2-601 ( 1 )(b) (2002). 
As originally enacted until 2009, the statute has required that the medical panel 
report promptly be sent to the claimant, the employer against whom compensation is 
claimed, and the employer's insurance carrier. In 2009, the statute was amended to 
require an administrative law judge to "promptly distribute full copies of a report 
submitted to the administrative law judge ... by mail to the applicant, the employer, the 
employer's insurance carrier, and an attorney" employed by any of them to handle the 
workers' compensation claim at issue. Utah Code§ 34A-2-601(d)(i). This amendment 
also extended the period to object to a panel rep011 from 15 to 20 days. Id. The 2013 
amendment added a provision allowing for employment of a full time medical director to 
create and enforce medical panel standards, to train and recruit panel members, and to 
ensure appropriate specialists are on the panels. Utah Code § 34A-2-601 (3)(a). 
While many of the requirements governing medical panels have varied over the 
years, the two requirements that have remained constant since 1949 are ( 1) that the 
medical panels submit a report in writing to the ALJ and (2) at the ALJ "promptly" 
provide copies of medical panel reports submitted to it to all parties. That requirement 
was strengthened in 2009 to include promptly sending medical panel reports to the 
parties' attorneys. 
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III. 
SECTION 34A-2-601 DOES NOT GRANT DISCRETION TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES TO REQUEST REVISIONS TO THE 
MEDICAL PANEL REPORTS WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE PARTIES. 
Section 34A-2-601 does not grant an ALJ discretion to request changes to a 
medical panel report, nor does it permit the AU to request such changes without first 
providing the report to the parties and allowing the pmiies an opportunity to object to the 
report. Section 34A-2-60 I (2)(b) states: "A medical panel, medical director, or medical 
consultant shall make: (i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form 
prescribed by the Division of Adjudication; and (ii) additional findings as the 
administrative law judge may require." Section 34A-2-601(2)(d)(i) then states: "An 
administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of a report submitted to the 
administrative law judge" to the relevant pai1ies by mail. Id. ( emphasis added). 1 The 
relevant parties then have 20 days to register an objection, and if no objections are 
received, the medical report is ··considered admitted evidence." Utah Code 
34A-2-601 (2)( d)(ii)-(iii). Nothing in these provisions can reasonably be read to grant the 
ALJ discretion to request that changes be made to the medical panel report, nor to request 
that such changes be made without providing the parties with notice and an opportunity 
to object. 
1 These parties include: the applicant, the employer, the employer's insurance carrier, and 
an attorney employed by any of the former. See Utah Code§ 34A-2-601(2)(d)(i)(A)-(D). 
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In reviewing the provisions above, the District Court determined that the ALJ's 
requests for changes to the medical reports at issue in this case were permissible and that 
the failure to notify the parties of these changes was reasonable, because, among other 
things, (I) the ALJ has discretion to ensure that the medical reports conform to the 
appropriate legal framev,/Ork, see FFCL, R. I 040, ,I 21, (2) none of the changes made to 
the medical reports at issue in this case were substantive, id., and (3) "'promptly' does 
not mean 'forth\vith' or 'immediately"' and the legislature must have had "some reason 
for requiring that the ALJ receive the panel report in advance of the parties." FFCL, R. 
I 036, ,I 5. The District Court's reasoning is incorrect for the reasons set forth below. 
A. Section 34A-2-601 Docs Not Grant ALis Discretion to Request 
Changes to a Medical Report. 
Section 34A-2-60 I does not grant the ALJ any discretion to request that changes 
be made to the medical report after it is issued. Section 34A-2-601 (2)(b) merely states 
that "[a] medical panel ... shall make ... a report in writing to the administrative law 
judge in a form prescribed by the Division of Adjudication." This provision is a 
mandatory directive to the medical panel requiring that the panel's report conform to the 
form that the Division of Adjudication has already prescribed before the medical report 
is issued. The provision makes clear that the Division of Adjudication, and not the ALJ, 
prescribes the form in which the report shall be made and also makes clear that it must do 
so prior to the report's issuance. 
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The grammar of the provision is instructive. See, e.g., Prisbey v. Bloomington 
Water Co., 2003 UT 56, ~ 17, 82 P.3d 1119 ("As this court has previously stated, an 
'application of elementary rules of punctuation and grammar' is useful in the legal 
interpretation of the text."') The directive to the medical panel is written in a prospective 
aspect (the panel shall make a report), while the form of the medical report is described 
with a past participle (in a form prescribed by the Division of Adjudication). That is, the 
Division of Adjudication (not the ALJ) has discretion to prescribe the form of the medical 
report, but the text and structure of the Act make clear that the Division must do so before 
the report is issued. Nothing in this provision reasonably can be read to grant the ALJ ( or 
even the Division of Adjudication) discretion to request changes in the content of the 
report after the report is signed by the medical panel and issued to the ALJ. Indeed, the 
text of this provision makes clear that rather than allow the ALJ to request ad hoc 
changes to the medical report after it is issued, the Division of Adjudication is required to 
set forth clear guidelines prior to the report's completion. 
The District Court stated that "the statute is silent about propounding further 
questions or correcting errors in the report." FFCL, R.1036-103 7, ii 6. This is incorrect. 
The ALJ is entitled to request that the panel make "additional findings." 
Id. at 60 I (2)(b )(ii). Thus, if the ALJ is concerned that the original medical panel report 
inappropriately relied on an unapproved treatment protocol, contained an inappropriate 
reference to the i~jured employee's alternative explanation of the accident, hedges its 
opinion by stating a likelihood of probability rather than a definitive yes or no, or other 
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similar concerns, the ALJ is allowed to ask the medical panel to address those issues by 
requesting additional findings. Moreover, the Act makes clear that the ALJ is not 
required to accept the medical panel's conclusions if "other substantial conflicting 
evidence in the case supports a contrary finding." Utah Code§ 34A-2-601. 
In its ruling, the District Com1 states that "the ALJ' s discretion is further informed 
by Utah Code§ 34A-2-802(1)," which exempts the ALJ from "the usual common law or 
statutory rules of evidence, or ... any technical or formal rules or procedure, other than 
as provided in this section or as adopted by the commission . ... " FFCL, R. 1038, 17 
(citing Utah Code§ 34A-2-802(1) (emphasis added)). The question is not whether the 
ALJ is bound by the common law or the Utah Rules of Evidence, but whether the ALJ is 
bound by the provisions of this section of the Act, which grant the Division of 
Adjudication-and not the ALJ-the exclusive discretion to determine the form of the 
medical report prior to its issuance, and require the ALJ to forward the report to the 
parties promptly after receipt. 
In his brief before the District Court, Chief ALJ LaJeunesse insisted that "the 
administrative law judge [is allowed to] not distribute copies of the medical panel report 
until after seeking additional findings as necessary or unless it was 'in proper form."' 
R. 957, 966 (citing Utah Code 34A-2-601(2)(d) (emphasis added)). But the quoted 
phrase, "in proper form," does not appear anywhere in the Act and there is nothing in the 
text or structure of the Act to suggest that the ALJ has discretion to police the form of the 
medical report or to demand changes to the report after it is issued. 
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The unreasonableness of the contrary reading of the Act is laid bare by the District 
Court's finding that while "[n]o written policy of the Labor Commission or Adjudication 
division expressly forbade returning the medical panel report to the medical panel," 
FFCL, R. 1034, ,r 55, "[n]o ALJ other than [ALJ] Hann engaged in the practice of 
rejecting signed medical reports and requesting changes without notice to the parties in 
the affected case." FFCL, R. 1034, ,r 56. If it is true that "[t]he quality of medical reports 
provided by the medical panel to the ALJs has long been a source of complaint among 
practitioners before the labor commission and the ALJs," it is telling that no other ALJ 
resorted to the remedy of returning the signed medical reports and requesting changes 
without notice to the parties. 
Because the Act does not grant the ALJs discretion to request changes to the 
medical report once it is issued, the District Court's ruling should be reversed. 
B. Section 34A-2-601 Does Not Permit Substantive Changes to the 
Medical Report. 
Even if the Act could be read to grant the ALJ discretion to request changes to the 
medical report after it is issued (which it can't), the changes to the medical reports at 
issue in this case cannot be justified on the basis of such an expansive reading because 
these changes were not merely formal, but substantive. Section 34A-2-601 provides that 
"[a] medical panel ... shall make ... a report in writing to the administrative law judge 
in a form prescribed by the Division of Adjudication." Nothing in this provision suggests 
that an ALJ is permitted to make substantive changes to the medical report. Indeed, in a 
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legal context questions of "form" are most often understood as distinct from matters of 
legal substance. See Black's Lavv Dictionary 767 (10th ed. 2014) ("Form, n. (13c) " l. 
The outer shape, structure, or configuration of something, as distinguished from its 
substance or matter.") ( emphasis added); The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) 
(" 12.a .... the customary or legal method of drawing up a writing or document."); 
Webster's Third New Int'! Dictionary 892 (1976) ("2a: the shape and structure of 
something as distinguished from the material of which is composed"); see also Guillen v. 
Pierce County, 110 P.3d 11 84, 1188 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) ("Accordingly, 'approval as 
to form' means approval of the structure of something, as opposed to its substance."); 
Dailey v. Albertson's, Inc. , 83 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Tex. App. 2015) (distinguishing 
between the form of an affidavit and its substance and holding that failure to base 
statements on personal knowledge is a substantive defect in an affidavit that can be raised 
for the first time on appeal) . 
The District Court stated that the ALJ's "purpose in permitting the return of the 
medical reports ,vas to correct errors of !aw," but that the ALJ "ha1 no purpose to 
substantively change the medical opinion or the underly ing result in any of the cases." 
FFCL, R. 1030, ~ 26 (emphasis added). Taken together, these statements are 
incompatible. If the ALJ endeavored to "correct errors of law" in the medical reports, 
then the resulting changes in the medical reports were, by definition, substantive. And 
review of the record makes clear that many of the changes to the medical repotts at issue 
in this case fall squarely on the substantive side of the form / substance d ivide. These 
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changes included a change in the medical standards listed in a report for the treatment 
protocol recommended by the medical panel, FFCL, R. 1031, , 34, a change in a 
causation finding from "possible, but highly unlikely" to "no" causation, id. FFCL, R. 
1031, iI 35, and the removal of a panel's findings with respect to an alternative theory of 
causation, id. p.6,, 35. Indeed, Commissioner Hayashi noted the difference between 
questions as to format ( e.g., whether the report should be prepared in WORD for 
WordPerfect) and whether the panel should include certain medical information in a 
report, which she characterized as substantive. See Testimony of Commissioner Sherrie 
Hayashi, R. 1643, 1811 (Line 3) through 1182 (Line 14). Cf Plumb v. State of Utah, 809 
P. 2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990) ("a master should not engage in ex parte contacts with the 
judge overseeing the case on matters pertinent to the substance of the referral"). 
It is not hard to imagine that a competent attorney representing an applicant or 
employer before the ALJ would view these changes as substantive and as possible 
grounds for appeal, particularly if the ALJ ultimately declined to accept the opinion of 
the medical panel, on the ground of abuse of discretion. And legal counsel would not be 
able to make that assessment, and thus fulfill his obligation to his client, if he was never 
told by the ALJ that the ALJ had requested a change to the original report. For this 
reason, the Act requires that the original medical report be sent to the parties promptly 
and gives each party the statutory right to object to the contents of the report. 
In addition, as noted above, even if the Act could be read to grant the ALJ 
discretion to request changes to the medical report after it is issued, failing to provide the 
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report to the parties prior to requesting such changes and failing, at the very least, to 
maintain a record of every version of the report would prevent the Labor Commissioner, 
or the Commission Appeals Board, or the Utah Court of Appeals from fulfilling their 
duty to review the ALJ' s decisions, and the ALJ' s conduct of the hearing, for abuse of 
discretion. 
Because the changes to the reports at issue in the present case are substantive 
changes, and because no fair reading of the Act permits the ALJ to request substantive 
changes to the medical report without notice to the parties and an opportunity to object, 
the District Court's ruling should be reversed. 
IV. 
IN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 34A-2-601, PROMPTLY MEANS 
IMMEDIATELY, AND THE PARTIES HAVE A STATUTORY 
RIGHT TO OBJECT. 
The Act requires that "[a] medical panel ... shall make ... a report in writing to 
the administrative law judge," Utah Code 34A-2-601 (2)(b ), and that the ALJ "shall 
promptly distribute full copies of a report submitted to the administrative law judge." Id. 
at 34A-2-601(2)(d)(i). The District Court "presumes there is some reason for requiring 
that the ALJ receive the panel report in advance of the parties" and "notes that 'promptly' 
does not mean 'forthwith' or 'immediately' and also presumes the legislature used this 
milder, more flexible term advisedly." FFCL, R. 1036, ,r 5. 
The District Court's interpretation of Section 34A-2-601(2)(d)(i) cannot be 
correct. To begin with, promptly very often means forthwith or immediately. See 
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Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 892 (1976) ("promptly ... : in a prompt manner: 
at once : IMMEDIATELY, QUICKLY."); The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) 
("In a prompt manner; readily, quickly; at once, without delay; directly, forthwith, there 
and then."); compare J.I. Rodale, The Synonym Finder (2016) ("prompt, adj. 
1. immediate, instant, instantaneous; direct, summary, fast; rapid, fleet, meteoric, quick, 
swift, brisk, expeditious .... "). 2 In the context of Section 34A-2-60 I (2)( d)(i), reading 
promptly as immediately not only makes the most sense, but no provision of the Act gives 
the ALJ discretion to do anything other than distribute the medical reports to the parties. 
As noted above, while the medical panel is directed to issue to the ALJ a medical report 
in a form that has been prescribed by the Division of Adjudication prior to the issuance 
of the report, nothing in the statutory scheme gives the ALJ the discretion to request that 
the report be amended, much less to require that the report be amended without providing 
the report to the parties. After the report is "promptly distribute[ d]" to the parties, the Act 
expressly contemplates that the parties will have a statutory right to object to the report 
within 20 days. Utah Code 34A-2-601(2)(d)(ii)-(iii). Without statutory authorization to 
do anything else with the report, the Act's requirement that the ALT "promptly distribute" 
the report to the parties is best understood as requiring the immediate distribution of the 
report without an interim request for changes. 
2 It is true that Section 34A-2-601 does not define "promptly." But if a statute does not 
define a particular term, the court may "discern an operative standard from dictionary 
definitions of the term and from other textual and contextual cues within the statute." Hi-
Country Prop. Rights Group v. Emmer, 2013 UT 33, 1 17, 304 P.3d 85 I. 
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The District Court states that "[t]he Court does not believe that the Legislature 
intended that, upon receipt of a flawed report, the ALJ has no option but to mail it to the 
parties and await objections." FFCL, R. I 036, 1 5. Regardless of what the legislature 
intended, the Act makes clear that the ALJ has a number of options upon receipt of a 
flawed report. The ALJ has discretion to request that the medical panel make "additional 
findings as the administrative law judge may require." Section 34A-2-601(2)(d)(i). And 
the ALJ is not required to accept the medical panel's conclusions if "other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding." Utah Code§ 34A-2-601. 
But the availability of these other options does not change the fact that the Act does not 
give the ALJ discretion to request changes to the report, or to request that such changes 
be made without providing the parties with notice and an opportunity to object. 
The District Court states that "the Court presumes there is some reason for 
requiring that the ALJ receive the panel report in advance of the parties." FFCL p.11, 1 5. 
Of course, there may be any number of reasons that the Act requires the medical panel to 
send the report to the ALJ in advance of the other parties (and then requires the ALJ to 
"promptly distribute" the report to the parties). The legislature may have presumed that 
the ALJ has a clerical staff to assist in copying and distributing the report and that the 
medical panel does not. The legislature may have also wished to foreclose ex parte 
communication between the medical panel and the parties by signaling to the parties that 
the report was being sent from the ALJ and that objections to the report should therefore 
be directed to the ALJ. But regardless of the legislature's purpose, the text and structure 
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of the Act make clear that the ALJ does not have discretion to request changes to the 
report or to request such changes without providing the parties with notice and an 
opportunity to object. Discretion as to the form of the medical report rests solely with the 
Division of Adjudication and its discretion must be exercised by prescribing the form of 
the report prior to its issuance. 
CONCLUSION 
The medical panel statute does not give an ALJ discretion to decide which panel 
reports she ,vill, or will not, send to the parties and their attorneys. The statute does not 
give an administrative law judge discretion to withhold sending a report to the parties 
based on a unilateral decision that the report is insufficient or deficient. 'fhe statute 
mandates that the Labor Commission "shall promptly distribute full copies of a report 
submitted to the administrative law judge . . . " to all parties regardless of the 
administrative law judge's perceived sufficiency of the report. 
Section 34A-2-601(2)(b) allows an ALJ to address perceived deficiencies in the 
report by requesting additional findings. By requiring the prompt distribution of the 
report to the parties and their counsel, Section 34A-2-601 also allows the parties to 
review the report and object or ask for clarification if they determine that the report is 
insufficient or deficient. Distributing all reports to all parties and their attorneys also 
safeguards the parties' due process rights and makes the litigation transparent. See, e.g., 
Plumb v. State of Utah, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990) ( citations omitted) ('Timely and 
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the very heart 
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of procedural fairness). Because the Act requires the AL.J promptly to distribute the 
medical report to the parties and grants the parties a statutory right to object to the report, 
the District Court misread and misapplied the statute . 
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§ 34A-2-601. Medical panel, director, or consultant--Findings ... , UT ST§ 34A-2-601 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 34a. Utah Labor Code (Refs &Annos) 
Chapter 2. Workers' Compensation Act (Refs &Annos) 
Part 6. Medical Evaluations 
U.C.A. 1953 § :34A.-2-0 01 
§ 34.A-2-601. Medical panel, director, or consultant--
Findings and rcports--Obj cctions to rcpor t--1 lcaring--Expcnscs 
Currentness 
( I )(a) T he Di\·ision o f Adjudication may refer the medical aspects ofa case described in this Subsection (J )(a) to a medical 
• panel appointed by an aclministrati\·e ht11· j udge: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
(i) upo n the filing of a claim for compensation arising out of and in the course of employment for: 
(A) d isability by accident; or 
(13) death by accident; and 
(ii) if the employer or the employer's insurance' carrier denies liability. 
(b) An administrative la\\' judge may appoint a medical panel upon the fil ing of a claim for compensation based upon 
disability or death due to an occupational disease . 
(c) A medical panel appointed under this section shall consist of one or more physicians specializing in the treatment 
of the disease or condition inrnlved in the claim. 
(cl) /\s an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a controverted 
case, the division may employ a medical director or one or more medical consultants: 
(i) on a ful l-time or part-time basis; and 
(i i) fo r the purpose of: 
(A) evalua ting medical evidence; and 
(B) advising an administrative Jaw judge with respect to the administrative law judge's u ltimate fact-finding 
responsibility. 
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§ 34A-2-601. Medical panel, director, or consultant--Findings ... 1 UT ST§ 34A-2-601 (j 
(e) If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or one or more medical consultants, the medical director or one 
or more medical consultants is allo\ved to function in the same manner and under the same procedures as required 
of a medical panel. 
(2)(a) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant may do the following to the extent the medical panel, 
medical director, or medical consultant determines that it is necessary or desirable: 
(i) conduct a study; 
(ii) take an x-ray; 
(iii) perform a test; or 
(iv) if authorized by an administrative law judge, conduct a post-mortem examination. 
(b) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall make: 
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form prescribed by the Division of Adjudication; and 
(ii) additional findings as the administratin: law judge may require. 
(c) In an occupational disease case, in addition to the requirements of Subsection (2)(6), a medical panel. medical 
director, or medical consultant shall certify to th~ administrati\'e law judge: 
(i) the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work for remuneration or profit; 
(ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion of the medical panel, medical director, or medical 
consultant results from the occupational disease; and 
(iii)(A) whether any other cause aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or 
death; and 
(B) if another cause contributed to the disability or death, the extent in percentage to \Vhich the other cause 
contributed to the disability or death. 
( d)(i) An administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of a report submitted to the administrative law 
judge under this Subsection (2) by mail to: 
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(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; 
(C) the employer's insurance carrier; and 
(D) an attorney employed by a person listed in Subsections (2)(d)(i)(A) through (C). 
(ii) Within 20 days after the report described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is deposited in the United States post office, the 
following may file with the administrative law judge a written objection to the report: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; or 
(C) the employer's insurance carrier. 
(iii) If no written objection is filed within the period described in Subsection (2)(d)(ii), the report is considered 
admitted in evidence. 
(c)(i) An aclrninistrntive law judge may base the administrative law judge's finding and decision on the report of: 
(A) a medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) one or more medical consultants. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection {2)(c)(i), an administrative law judge is not bound by a report described in 
Subsection (2)(e)(i) if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding. 
(f)(i) If a written objection to a report is filed under Subsection (2)(d), the administrative law judge may set the case 
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. 
(ii) At a hearing held pursuant to this Subsection (2)(f), any party may request the administrative law judge to have 
any of the following present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination: 
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(A) the chair of the medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) the one o r more medical consultants. 
(iii) For good cause shown, an administrative law judge may order the fo llowing to be present at the hearing for 
examination a nd cross-examination: 
(A) a member of a medical pa nel, with or without the chair oft he medical panel; 
(B) the medical di rector; or 
(C) a medical consultant. 
(g)(i) /\ written report of a medical panel, medical di rector, or one or more medical consul tants may be received as 
an exhibit at a hearing described in Subsection (2)(f). 
(ii) Not\\"i thstancling Subsection (2)(g)( i), a report received as an exhibit under Subsection (2)(g)(i) may not be 
considered as evidence in the case except as fa r as the report is sustained by the testimony admitted . 
(h) For a claim referred under Subsection ( I) lo a medical panel, medica l director, or medical consultant before July 
I, 1997, the commission shall pay out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund established in Section 34/\-2-702: 
(i) expenses ofa study or report of the medical panel, medical cl ircclor, or medical consultant; and 
(ii) the expenses of the medical panel's, medical director's, o r medical consultant's appearance before an 
administrative law judge. 
(i)(i) For a claim referred under Subsection ( I) to a medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant on or after 
July I, 1997, the commission shall pay out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund established in Section 34A-2-704 the 
expenses of: 
(A) a study or report of the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant; and 
(B) the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical consultant's appearance before an administrative law judge. 
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§ 34A-2-601 . Medical panel, director, or consultant--Findings ... , UT ST§ 34A-2-601 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34A-2-704, the expenses described in Subsection (2)(i)(i) shall be paid from the 
U ninsured Employers' Fund whether or not the employment relationship during which the industrial accident or 
occupational disease occurred is localized in Utah as described in Subsection 34A-2-704(20). 
(3)(a) The commission may employ a qualified physician as medical panel director who, in addition to the other duties 
outlined in this section for a medical director, is responsible for: 
(i) assisting the commission in creat ing and enforcing standards fo r medical panels and medica l consultants; 
(ii) training members of medical panels or medical consultants; 
(iii) increasing the number of physicians who participate on medical panels; 
(i\') ensuring medical panels indudc appropriate specialists; and 
(,·) monitoring the quality of medical panel and medical consultant 1-.::ports. 
(b) The commission shall pay Lhe expenses or employing a med ical panel di rector described in this Subsection (3) out 
of the Uninsured Employers' F und established in Section 34A-2-704. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR 
SALTLAKEDEPARTMENT,SALTLAKECOUNTY,STA OFUTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline of : 
Richard La J eunesse, Bar No. 7408, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUS ONS OF LAW 
Case N . 130905706 
Judge A drew Stone 
This case concerns attorney discipline. The Office of Professional C nduct ("OPC") 
seeks findings that Respondent Richard La J eunesse ("La J eunesse") violated Rule 
8.4(0) of Utah's Rules of Professional Conduct by engaging "in con uct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice." A bench trial was held ebruary 22 
through 26, 2016 and the Court now enters the following Findings o Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
Findings of Fact 
Unless otherwise noted, the Court finds the following facts to have een shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
1. La Jeunesse is an attorney licensed to practice law in the stat of Utah. 
2. La Jeunesse has been a member of the Utah Bar since 1996. 
3. He began his career as a hearing officer at the Labor Com.mi ion in 1995, 
becoming an administrative law judge (" ALJ") in 2000. Heb came the Director 
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of the Commission's Adjudication Division in 2001, and held at position 
continuously until 2012. 
4. As Director, La Jeunesse supervised other ALJs in the divisio , including Debbie 
Hann ("Hann"). 
5. The ALJ s in the division hear contested claims for workers' c mpensation. 
6. In many such cases, the ALJ appoints a medical panel to advi e the ALJ 
regarding the contested medical issues in the case. 
7. Typically, a workers' compensation claimant has a treating o other physician 
who renders an opinion as to the origin and compensability f the claimed 
injury. 
8. The respondent in a contested workers' compensation case ( employer or 
insurer) typically hires a physician as well, who may render competing opinion 
regarding the injury. This is often rendered after an indepen ent medical 
examination ("IME"), during which the defense physician pe forms an 
examination of the claimant. 
9. The ALJ may refer the medical aspects of the case to a medic panel. Utah Code 
34A-2-601. Such referral is discretionary. Intermountain Healt Care, Inc. v. Bd. of 
Review of Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 841,845 (Utah Ct. pp. 1992) states: 
The function of the medical panel is to give the Commiss on "the 
benefit of its diagnosis relating to those matters that are 
particularly within the scope of its expertise." IGA Food F ir v. 
Martin, 584 P.2d 828,830 (Utah 1978). However, "the fin 
responsibility of making the decision as to the issues in s ch a 
proceeding is given to the Commission," id., and the me · cal 
panel may not take over this responsibility of the Co · sion. Id. 
at 830 n. 4. Accord, Jensen v. United States Fuel Co., 424 P. d 440., 
442 (Utah 1967). Thus, the role of the medical panel is o y "to 
assist the administrative law judge in deciding whether edical 
cause has been proven." Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial 
731 P.2d 1079., 1084 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added). 
2 
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Id. 839 P.2d at 845 (footnotes omitted). 
10. Medical panels are considered "adjunct" to the ALJ at the co mission level. La 
Jeunesse introduced commission decisions, by multiple labor commissioners, 
stating as much. 
11. Prior to referring a case to a medical panel, the ALJ makes in rim findings. The 
medical panel is bound by those factual findings: 
It is not the role of the medical panel to resolve conflicts · the 
factual evidence regarding the injured party1s activities .... the 
Code places that responsibility solely on the Commissio . . . . the 
medical panel is only to take the facts as found by the 
administrative law judge and consider them in light of it medical 
expertise to assist the administrative law judge in decid · g 
whether medical cause has been proven. The medical p el strays 
beyond its province when it attempts to resolve factual d sputes, 
and the administrative law judge improperly abdicates h s 
function if he permits the panel to so act. 
Price River Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm 'n of Utah, 731 P.2d 1079, 1084 Utah 1986). 
12. Contrastingly, the ALJ is not required to accept the medical p nel's conclusions if 
"substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a contr ry finding." Utah 
Code § 34A-2-601. 
13. The statute provides that the medical panel shall make : 
i. A report in writing to the administrative law ju ge in a form 
prescribed by the Division of Adjudication; an 
ii. Additional findings as the administrative law j dge may require. 
Utah Code§ 34A-2-601(2)(b ). 
14. The statute also provides that 
An administrative law judge shall promptly di ibute full copies of 
a report submitted to the administrative law ju ge under this 
Subsection (2) by mail to 
A) the applicant 
3 
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B) the employer 
C) the employer's insurance carrier; an 
D) an attorney employed by [the above] 
Utah Code § 34A-2-601(2)( d). 
15. Once the medical panel report is sent to the parties, the parti shave 20 days to 
file objections to the report. If no objections are made, the re ort is "considered 
admitted in evidence." Utah Code §34A-2-601(d)(iii). If obje ·ons are made the 
ALJ may set a hearing. In practice, such hearings are almost ever held. The ALJ 
ordinarily rules on the objections and decides what portions f the report to 
admit and rely on. 
16. Medical panels are compensated by the commission. 
17. Recruitment and training of the medical panels is the respo 
Director of Adjudication (at all relevant times here, La Jeunes e). 
18. The quality of medical reports provided by the medical pane to the ALJs has 
long been a source of complaint among practitioners before e labor commission 
and the ALJs. 
19. Typical complaints regarding the panel reports are that they ssume facts 
beyonc;i or contrary to the interim findings, or that opinions a e phrased in terms 
of percentages instead of legally required conclusions. 
20. Training was offered to the medical panel participants on an pproximately 
annual basis. In addition, La Jeunesse would attempt to pro de training to 
individual physicians as they came on. 
21. It was not uncommon for ALJs to discuss cases pending befo e medical panels 
with members of those panels. The form referral letter invite such 
correspondence. It was common at annual training sessions r doctors to raise 
questions regarding pending cases. 
4 
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,.-,....,,, 22. Complaints about the medical panel reports became particul rly intense in late 
2011. 
23. In January 2012, La J eunesse discussed with Hann whether e statute permitted 
the ALJ to reject a report and request changes to its form in o der to comply with 
the legal requirements applicable to medical reports. 
24. La Jeunesse testified that he reached the conclusion that such a determination lay 
within the ALJ' s discretion, and agreed with ALJ Hann thats e could do so. 
25. The Court finds that La Jeunesse had a good faith belief that is statutory 
interpretation permitting the return of a signed report to a m dical panel for 
technical revision was correct. 
26. La J eunesse' s purpose in permitting the return of the medica reports was to 
correct errors of law or phrasing contained in the reports and to train the 
physicians who had prepared them. He had no purpose to s stantively change 
the medical opinion or the underlying result in any of the cas s. 
27. Hann used this "discretion" in five cases between January an June of 2012. 
28. La Jeunesse knew of three of these instances. 
29. The commission determined, and the Court finds, that there as "no basis to 
believe" that Hann or La Jeunesse had attempted "to influen e the panels' 
opinions or change the substance of their reports." "Instead," the commission 
concluded, they "were motivated by a desire to have the me ·cal panels clarify 
their conclusions." 
30. All of LaJeu.nesse's actions were taken as part of his duties a 
Director of the Adjudication Division. 
31. In at least two of these cases, Hann shredded the initial repor sent by the 
medical panel. 
5 
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32. No evidence was offered that La Jeunesse knew of the shred ing until after the 
practice of returning medical reports for changes was publicl known. 
33. The database tracking the receipt of medical reports was alte ed to delete 
reference to the report being delivered to the ALJ to show th t the report was 
again with the medical panel. The system retained a notation of the original 
delivery of the report and contained notes stating that the ori · al had been 
- . 
shredded in c1.t least two instances. However, no evidence wa offered suggesting 
that La Jeunesse had anything to do, directly or indirectly, w· 
entries. 
34. In one of the three cases La Jeunesse knew about, Swenson v. Modem Display, 
La Jeunesse was on the p4one with the medical panel chair hen the changes 
were discussed. The proposed report recommended a treatm nt protocol under 
certain medical standards. These standards were not univers y accepted in the 
medical community and had not been adopted by the labor c mmission. La 
Jeunesse explained to Dr. Holmes (the medical panel chair)_ t at the commission 
could not require specific standards without rulemaking. H told the doctor he 
needed to clarify that the standards were not binding on trea · g physicians. Pr. 
Holmes agreed to change the report, and offered to bring an mended report in 
personally. 
35. In another of the three cases La Jeunesse knew of, the Boyt c se, Dr. Rosen had 
used language concerning causation indicating "possible but highly unlikely" for 
a theory ascribed less than a 2% probability. At Harm's requ st, he changed his 
opinion of causation to a simple "no" rather than using the q alified language. 
Dr. Rosen did not feel the change altered the intent of his ori inal answers to the 
questions posed to the panel. 
36. In the Doherik case (the third case known to LaJeunesse), D . Rosen discussed 
alternative factual versions of the fall at issue. The ALJ had ready made 
findings regarding those facts, and Dr. Rosen deleted that di cussion. He 
shortened other answers from more qualified answers to s · le "no" s in other 
6 
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answers. Rosen testified that, as in the Boyt case, he did not £ el the requested 
changes altered the panel's medical opinions. 
37. No testimony was offered by any witness suggesting that th changes in these 
three cases did not address legitimate concerns over the leg form of the reports. 
No testimony was offered that any of the medical opinions · the reports were 
substantively altered as a result of the contact from Hann or in the Swenson 
case) LaJeunesse. 
38. On June 5, 2012, Dori Petersen, a private practitioner at Black urn and Stoll, 
called the commission to inquire about an overdue medical el report. She was 
told that Hann had received the report from Dr. Rosen and r jected it, sending it 
back to the medical panel for correction. According to Peters n "If it were anyone 
but Judge Hann, I probably wouldn't thlnk much about this, ut it's Judge Hann. 
The medical panel is enough of a wild card without Judge H 
on how to prepare their report." 
instructing them 
39. Petersen relayed these facts to other members of the bar prac · cing at the 
Workers' Compensation Fund ("WCF"). 
40. Petersen also called Alan Hennebold, a senior attorney at the Commission to ask 
about the practice. He informed Petersen that the medical re ort had been 
shredded. 
41. Hennebold met with La Jeunesse on June 5, and directed him that parties should 
be copied on any rejections or instructions to medical panel r ports. His opinion 
at the time was that "while Judge Hann' s actions may have b en entirely 
appropriate, the lack of transparency is inappropriate." 
42. Hennebold instructed La Jeunesse to inform all ALJ s of this 
43. Later, Sherri Hayashi, Labor Commissioner, instructed La Je esse to amend 
existing policy to make clea~ that panel reports that were fla ed would be sent 
to the parties. 
7 
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44. Hayashi requested an independent audit to determine the e tent of the practice. 
45. The audit identified five cases in which medical reports wer sent pack to panels 
without notice to the parties. 
46. The original report was recovered in four of the five total cas s and in all three of 
the cases known to La Jeunesse. 
47. Hayashi placed La Jeunesse on administrative leave on June 3, 2012, based on 
the actions described above. 
48. Hayashi terminated La Jeunesse from his position as Directo of the Adjudication 
Division and ALJ on July 10, 2012. The termination was base on his ''failure to 
insist on open and transparent processes" involving the me cal panel reports. 
49. Hayashi testified that the problem, in her view, was not the ecision to return the 
reports for correction to the medical panels, but rather the fa· ure to inform the 
parties of that decision and the nature of the changes request d. 
50. None of the three cases La Jeunesse knew about was appeale . 
51. In at least two of the affected cases, new medical panels were convened. No 
evidence was offered of any change in the result. 
52. On August 14, 2012, WCF filed bar complaints against Hann d La Jeunesse. 
53. On August 15, WCF moved to recuse Hann from all of its cas s. The motion to 
recuse attached a copy of the bar complaint. The motion was served on the new 
Director of the Adjudication Division. It was not served on y of the parties to 
the cases affected. 
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54. The Motion to recuse was granted in two days, again no noti e was provided 
prior to this decision to the other parties in the affected cases 
55. No ALJ other than Hann engaged in the practice of rejecting igned medical 
reports and requesting changes without notice to the parties the affected case. 
56. No written policy of the Labor Commission or Adjudication ivision expressly 
forbade returning the medical panel report to the medical p el. OPC attempted 
to introduce an exhibit which, they proffered, established su a policy. OPC 
acknowledged that this document was in its position prior to the date of initial 
disclosures and did not demonstrate that it had been produc d in initial 
disclosures. OPC argued that, because it had received the do ment from La 
Jeunesse's prior counsel, La Jeunesse suffered no harm from ·s failure to 
disclose. La Jeunesse maintained that he did not know where the proffered 
document had been obtained, knew nothing of its history, an had prepared 
relying on OPC's initial disclosures omitting it. Based on thi, the Court 
concluded the document had not been timely disclosed and e failure to 
disclose was not shown to be harmless, and therefore exclud d the document. 
57. It appears that La Jeunesse drafted a policy, prior to the evens in question, 
including the language "Once the ALJ receives the panel rep rt, it is mailed to 
the petitioner and attorneys." It was not clear to what extent · s earlier written 
policy was distributed or effected within the Commission. L J eunesse used the 
earlier policy when asked to revise it in response to the event at issue, but it 
does not appear to have been widely known-La Jeunesse fo d it because he 
recalled working on it previously. 
58. No evidence showed that La Jeunesse knew of the destructio of medical reports 
after changes to them were requested until after the matter c e to light within 
the commission. At best, La Jeunesse testified that this was urprising, given 
the decision to request changes and the confidential nature o the medical 
information discussed in the reports. After the fact, La Jeune se did not take 
issue with this destruction for that reason. 
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to do so. No evidence showed he agreed to any proposal to lter any database or 
authorized such action. 
60. No person actually testified that he or she lost faith in the ad inistration of 
justice as a result of these actions. Various witnesses speculat d as to other 
parties' reactions to them. 
61. The events drew unfavorable media attention. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. At the close of OPC' s case, the Court granted a motion to dis iss in part. The 
Court concluded that the evidence did not support a finding at La Jeunesse 
knew of or authorized either 1) the destruction of medical p el reports when 
first received; or 2) any alteration of the Commission's datab ses. 
2. The parties initially phrased their arguments in this case as ether La J eunesse 
and other ALJs are obligated under the statute, upon receipt, o forward the 
medical panel's report as received to the parties. La Jeunesse oints to subsection 
2(b) of the statute providing that reports are to be made "in a form prescribed by 
the Division" and also address "additional findings as the ad inistrative law 
judge may require." OPC points to subsection 2(d), which pr vides that "an 
administrative law judge-shall promptly distribute full copie of a report 
submitted to the administrative law judge" to the parties. 
3. Throughout the case, the parties presented competing views £ the medical 
panels. OPC and its witnesses (representatives of the defens bar and the 
Commissioner) attempted to portray the medical panels as,,. dependent" 
arbiters. Testimony to the effect that medical panel opinions re generally 
accepted by the ALJ and the Commission, and thus dispositi e, perhaps 
10 
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explained this perception. La Jeunesse emphasizes that med cal panels, though 
impartial, only serve to advise the ALJ. 
4. The Court concludes that the La Jeunesse' s view is correct. e word 
"independent" does not appear in §34A-2-601. Medical pane s make no 
"findings" in the legal sense. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. . Bd. of Review of 
Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 841,847 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1 92). They are 
"adjuncts" to the ALJ, and their purpose is to assist the ALJ · making his or her 
findings. The ALJ, also an impartial neutral, is free to accept he panel's report or, 
if there is substantial conflicting evidence, find to the contra . 
5. The structure of the statute is also informative. It expressly r quires that the 
report is made by the panel to the ALJ, and the ALJ, after the report is submitted, 
must promptly mail it to the parties. Neither "submitted" n "promptly" is 
defined. This may seem like a close parse of the statute, but e Court presumes 
there is some reason for requiring that the ALJ receive the p el report in 
advance of the parties. The Court also notes that "promptly" oes not mean 
"forthwith" or "immediately" and also presumes the Legisla e used this 
milder, more flexible term advisedly. The Court does not beli ve that the 
Legislature intended that, upon receipt of a flawed report, th ALJ has no option 
but to mail it to the parties and await objections. A report ma fail to answer the 
propounded questions. It may rely on facts contrary to the A J's findings. It may 
use language that, though medically appropriate, is legally w ong. Under the 
reading advanced by OPC, such flawed reports would neces ·tate a round of 
objections, after which, according to the OPC, the ALJ could en request 
clarification or amendment, or refer to another panel. 
6. OPC' s reading of the statute, that clarification requests are pe mitted after an 
original report is mailed to the parties, has no more support · the statutory 
language than the reading advanced by La Jeunesse allowing a report to be 
returned to the medical panel before distribution to the parti s. Once mailed to 
the parties, an objection process starts. Absent objection, the port is admitted 
into evidence. Titls would be true even if the ALJ, as the fact · der, determined 
that the report failed to answer the proper questions using th 
11 
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assumptions. Even after objections, the statute is silent abou propounding 
further questions or correcting errors in the report. The statu e makes no 
provision for correction beyond permitting the panel to mak II additional 
findings as the administrative law judge may require." Utah 
601(2)(b ). The statute does not specify at what point that mig 
7. The Court's interpretation of the extent of the ALJ' s discretio 
informed by Utah Code §34A-2-802(1), which provides: 
The commission, the commissioner, an administrative la 
or the Appeals Board, is not bound by the usual commo law or 
statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal es or 
procedure, other than as provided in this section or as ad pted by 
the commission pursuant to this chapter and Chapter 3, tah 
Occupational Disease Act. The commission may make its 
investigation in such a manner as in its best judgment is 
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the partie 
carry out justly the spirit of the chapter. 
8. The statute provides for review of the medical panel report b 
mailing to the parties. Given the role of the medical panel as e ALJ' s assistant, 
the statute implicitly permits the ALJ to seek further assistan e prior to deeming 
the report as submitted and mailing it to the interested partie . La J eunessse did 
not prejudice the administration of justice by interpreting the statute to grant this 
discretion to the ALJ. 
9. Testimony of existing labor commission policies was unclear. As found above, it 
appears that La Jeunesse drafted a policy, prior to the events question, 
including the language "Once the ALJ receives the panel rep rt, it is mailed to 
the petitioner and attorneys." It was not clear to what extent · s written policy 
was distributed or effected within the Commission. In any e ent, it reads too 
much into this statement to imply a construction of the statu necessarily 
requiring immediate delivery without review or comment b the ALJ. 
10. A more difficult question arises whether or not the ALJ coul properly return the 
report to the medical panel and request corrections without otifying the parties. 
Commissioner Hayashi viewed this (rather than a failure to· edi~tely send 
12 
01037 
( 
~ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
@·,\ 
. / 
-----· :; 
I 
I@ 
the report to the parties) as the problem and OPC also emph sized this point in 
argument. 
11. As an initial matter, the evidence is extremely thin as to this onduct as it relates 
to La Jeunesse. As stated above, there is no evidence that La J unesse took any 
action to conceal the return of the medical panel reports by d straying them or 
alt~ring any electronic database reflecting their receipt. La J e esse, in a 
discussion with Hann, interpreted the statute to permit the r turn of the reports 
to the panel. He also participated in a teleconference discuss· g changes with Dr. 
Holmes. La Jeunesse was not assigned to any of the affected ases, and OPC 
offered no testimony or evidence suggesting that this collater participation in a 
case would obligate an ALJ consulted by another ALJ to him elf provide notice 
to the parties. The Court therefore considers whether the La eunesse' s 
participation with Hann in the contact with the medical pane was improper by 
itself. 
12. No testimony was offered that contact with medical panels s prohibited. To 
the contrary, the testimony was that medical panels were inv ted to contact the 
assigned ALJ and discussed specific cases under review with ALJ s, including at 
their annual training sessions. Likewise, no testimony was o fered of an existing 
policy (formal or informal) requiring these communications t be disclosed. 
13. While ALJs are quasi-judicial, the Code of Judicial Conduct i instructive here. 
Rule 2.9 of those Rules prohibits most ex parte communicatio , outside of 
certain defined parameters. One of those exceptions seem re vant here: 
(A)(3) A judge may consult with court staff and court of · cials 
whose functions are to aid the judge in carrying out the j dge' s 
adjudicative responsibilities, or with other judges, provi ed the 
judge makes reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual 
information that is not part of the record and does not ab ogate 
the responsibility to personally decide the matter. 
14. The issue in this case is not whether better practice would be o inform parties 
when a medical report is rejected by an ALJ, or other comm · cation is made by 
13 
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the ALJ with a member of a medical panel. The issue is whet er an ALJ commits 
an ethical or other violation when the ALJ fails to do so. 
15. The medical panel is recruited, appointed and paid by the c mission to advise 
the ALJ. As such, they are akin to a "court officials whose ctions are to aid the 
judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilitie II under Rule 2.9 of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Moreover, the deliberately les formal nature of 
the administrative process argues even more strongly that A J's can 
appropriately have ex parte contact-with persons specifically employed to 
provide them expertise. 
16. The nature of the contacts here illustrates the utility of reco izing this flexibility. 
When a medical panel fails to follow binding interim finding and the ALJ -· 
recognizes that fact in advance, it makes no sense to submit e flawed report to 
the parties for objections, only to resubmit it to the panel the after. A report 
based on factual assumptions inconsistent with the ALJ' s fin ings is not helpful, 
and it is inefficient to require parties to make objections to it, r worse yet, to 
admit it to evidence by default if no objections are made. L · wise, if opinions 
are hedged with percentages or remote qualifications, the re ort fails to clearly 
communicate the achtal opinion the panel intends the ALJ to e. If in the ALJ' s 
view the opinion needs to be clarified, there is no purpose se ved by submitting 
it to the parties for objections to the obvious. 
17. Informing the parties of these corrections may seem laudable and even harmless 
in theory. It is easy to argue that the more transparency, the etter. But that view 
stems from an improper view of the medical panel as a separ te decision maker. 
As discussed above, it is not. The medical panel functions as an adjunct to the 
ALJ-analogous to an assistant or clerk. Rule 2.9 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
contemplates such communications between judges and emp oyed assistants. It 
is the same rule that permits a judge to confer with a law cler or other judges. 
In the informal atmosphere of administrative decision makin , such 
communications are even more appropriate. Requiring comp ete transparency 
may inhibit free communication between the decision maker d his or her 
assistants. It could also engender additional litigation over r port flaws and 
14 
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ALJ' s efforts to correct or clarify them. While the commissio is certainly free to 
restrict its ALJs in such a manner if it chooses to, the statute oes not necessarily 
require such a result. 
18. The Court concludes that no existing statute or policy, forma or informal, 
prohibited communications between a medical panel and A J s concerning a case 
under review. No existing statute or policy required the par 1 • es to be informed 
of such contacts. · 
19. Nevertheless, failure to disclose is potentially problematic. E 
communications potentially inform the ALJ' s decision, and a sent disclosure the 
parties are unable to address or respond to substantive com 
the judge. 
20. At least one court considering similar circumstances has con luded that such 
contacts require reversal. Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Workers' C mpensation Appeals 
Board, 153 Cal Ap. 3d 965 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1984). But the la is far from clear 
as to the propriety of ex parte contacts with court-appointed experts or 
consultants. See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting aubert's Invitation: 
Defining A Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scienti c Validity, 43 
Emory L.J. 995, 1029-33 (1994) (discussing apparently widesp ead contacts by 
courts with court appointed experts) and John Shepard Wile , Jr., Taming Patent: 
Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent Cases, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 14 3, 1459-60 (2003) 
(analogizing technical advisors to law clerks, but acknowled · g a lack of 
appellate authority). At least one California workers' compe sation decision 
refers to a policy that would arguably permit the communica · ons at issue here. 
Blackledge v. Bank of America, 2010 Westlaw 2204836 (Cal W.C. .B.) (citing 
WCAB/DWC policy prohibiting ex parte communications by ALJ with disability 
raters "except to clarify or correct clerical or technical errors r omissions.") 
21. La Jeunesse' s failure to disclose in these specific cases does n t rise to the level of · 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. First, the was no testimony 
that La Jeunesse authorized or instructed Hann not to disclos the 
communications. La Jeunesse was not assigned to the cases a issue, so any duty 
15 
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C) to disclose would lie with Hann, and not La J eunesse as ano er ALJ consulted 
by her. Second, the specific changes in the cases known of b La Jeunesse were 
not substantive and the parties were not deprived of a mean gful opportunity 
to contest them-indeed, there was no evidence that any oft e requested 
changes to the panel reports were inappropriate or altered t e panel's medical 
conclusions. In each of the cases known to La Jeunesse the o · ginal report was 
located and provided to the parties. Third, reasonable legal inds can differ as 
to whether such communications involving technical correc 
report are necessarily improper, or must be disclosed to the arties. Finally, the 
preponderance of the evidence showed that the purpose oft e communications 
was to conform the opinions to the appropriate legal framew rk, and thus avoid 
non-substantive objections and the delay and expense associ ted with them. 
22. Finally, OPC maintains that a violation of statute or policy is ot required to find 
a violation of Rule 8.4(d). Instead, OPC argues all that is req · ed is 1) conduct 
and 2) resulting prejudice t~ the administration of justice. 
23. OPC argues that La Jeunesse's authorization and participatio in the return of 
medical reports to medical panels without notice to the parti s constituted 
conduct, and that it resulted in delay and increased costs. Th t, OPC argues, is 
enough-the question of severity is reserved for the Court w en it determines 
sanctions. 
24. The Court rejects this reading of Rule 8.4. Attorneys and jud s interpret laws all 
the time. On any given day, the Court is confronted by multi le cases involving 
competing interpretations of law- at least one side is generall wrong. Attorneys 
and judges take actions or advise others to take actions based on those 
interpretations. Often, such an interpretation (it matters not hether it is right or 
wrong, under the OPC' s argument here requiring only cond ct) causes delay or 
increased expense. 
25. In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 868-69 (Utah 1996) is a case in w 
Supreme Court interpreted similar language in the Utah Con titution concerning 
judicial discipline. While the comparison is not entirely apt t this interpretation 
16 
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of the Rules of Professional Conduct applicable to attorneys, e concerns 
expressed in that opinion are instructive: 
The offenses that subject a judge to discipline should e 
defined in such a way as to minimize the potential for 
overlap between the judicial conduct machinery and t e 
appeal process. For it is worth emphasis that a judge h s not 
behaved improperly simply because he has committe an 
error. As we noted earlier, the entire appellate process is in 
place because it is expected that judges will err occasi ally, 
at least in the eyes of the appellate courts. This does n t 
mean that they are not functioning properly as judges, only 
that they are human beings functioning within a hum 
institution where different people can see things differ ntly. 
The [disciplinary] process cannot legitimately have as 
purpose the punishment of those who commit legal er or; 
rather, it must concern itself only with those who beh e 
outside the ethical norms set for judges, and the consti tion 
and implementing statutes and rules must be so cons ued. 
In re Worthen, at, 868-69. 
26. OPC's proposed reading of 8.4 goes too far. By simply exam· · g "conduct" and 
its asserted effect on the administration of justice, OPC fails t account for legal 
error, which itself is part of the administration of justice. Ord ary error or 
differences of opinion are not prejudicial to justice; they are s mething we expect 
on the way to truth. 
27. In addition, the Court cannot conclude that the actions here ecessarily resulted 
in delay. To answer that question, the Court would have to h ve evidence 
sufficient to conclude what delay might have been caused by the reports being 
submitted without the requested corrections. No testimony r evidence as to 
that scenario was offered. 
28. The Comments to Rule 8.4 also provide guidance as to its pr per interpretation: 
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitnes to 
practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the of nse of 
willful failure to file an income tax return. However, so_ . e kinds 
of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the 
17 
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was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitu e." That 
concept can be construed to include offenses concerning ome 
matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comp able 
offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for th practice 
of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to th entire 
criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answera le only 
for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics rele ant to 
law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, br ach of 
trust or serious interference with the ad!Ilinistration of j tice are 
in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even one of 
minor significance when considered separately, can indi ate 
indifference to legal obligation. 
Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, Rule 8.4 ( co ent 2), ( quoted in 
Utah State Bar v. Jardine, 2012 UT 67, <JI 76, 289 P.3d 516, 533) 
29. In re Worthen is again helpful. In explaining the terms "cond ct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice" in the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, 13, the Supreme 
Court concluded that language also implied some breach of thical canons: 
Finally, the first clause employs the term "conduct 
rather than the term "misconduct" as used in the · st 
ground for judicial discipline, which could, on its f ce, 
suggest that the act or acts covered by this ground ould 
be other than a breach of the ethical norms gove · g 
judges. However, concerns about limiting the Cammi sion 's 
jurisdiction to matters of misconduct, not legal error, as well as 
concerns about vagueness and adequate notice, lead us o 
conclude that the term should carry the same de · ition 
we gave to "misconduct," i.e., both grounds requir 
"unjudicial conduct," which we defined as a brea 
the ethical canons contained in the Code of Judicia 
Conduct. 
In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 870 (Utah 1996)(emphasis adde ). 
30. Similarly, though Rule 8.4 is entitled "Misconduct'' and uses that term in other 
parts of the Rule, Section 8.4 (d) refers to just "conduct." As· Worthen, this on its 
face supports OPC 's argument here. But for the same reaso s as articulated in 
Worthen, the Court concludes that Rule 8.4( d) cannot be read to put stricter limits 
on advocacy than those imposed by existing norms. Certa · y, an objectively 
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reasonable position taken in good faith by an ALJ in fulfillm nt of his or her 
duties cannot support a claim that the conduct taken as a res It is a violation of 
Rule 8.4( d). The line to be drawn here needs to permit and e en encourage 
acceptable legal advocacy including, in this case, administra on of an agency's 
quasi-judicial process. For that reason, the line to be drawn efining where a 
Rule 8.4( d) begins should provide some daylight between re sonable 
interpretations of law on the one hand and ethical violations 
31. As found above, none of La Jeunesse's actions involved any orally questionable 
motive. This is not a repeated pattern of independent violati ns but a single 
change in interpretation affecting five cases. The Court has c ncluded that the 
actions were either legally permitted or at least did not viola e express statute or 
policy. More importantly, whether or not the actions were le ally correct or even 
advisable, they were taken pursuant to objectively reasonabl legal 
interpretations. No violation of Rule 8.4(d) has been shown. 
32. The petition should be dismissed with prejudice. Counsel fo La J eunesse is 
directed to prepare an order of dismissal. 
f/~I-
DATED this~ day of March, 2016. 
Third District Court J 
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